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Abstract 
Although a multiplicity of local governments is often regarded as promoting efficiency in the 
supply of public services, political fragmentation can generate economies of scale and externality 
problems. Several exogenous solutions, including the creation of overlapping districts governments, 
consolidation of existing units and establishment of a metropolitan government, or direct state or 
federal intervention, have been offered. We argue that cooperative governance offers a potential 
endogenous solution to this dilemma. By combining transaction cost and social exchange theories 
within the institutional collective action framework, we investigate how local governments 
themselves address inefficiencies from externalities and economies of scale. An empirical analysis 
of Georgia cities reports that while cities’ choice of service collaboration is affected by the 
transaction characteristics of services, their level of service collaboration is greatly influenced by 
the previous exchange that builds trust and by the level of fiscal pressure they face. 
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Interlocal Cooperation in the Supply of Local Public Goods: A Transaction Cost and 
Social Exchange Explanation 
 
 
Local governments provide a wide variety of local public goods and services to 
their citizens. In a fragmented political setting, production of these services generates 
economies of scale and externality problems. For most local public goods and services, 
costs per unit decrease with the scale of production (Hirsch 1964). A large scale production 
allows sharing of capital equipment (such as a crime lab or fire truck) and labor (forensic 
expert or arson investigator) that reduce the per unit production cost. The limitations 
imposed by jurisdiction size prevents full realization of scale economies to many municipal 
governments, thus production remains inefficient.  
Externalities also constrain efficiency because the actions of one government affect 
other units (Williams 1966). For example, a high level of police protection by one city may 
result lower crime in neighboring jurisdictions leading to a sub-optimal allocation of its law 
enforcement expenditures. On the other hand, excess demand on local facilities (for 
example, roads, parks, beaches, etc) by non-residents generates congestion in the supply of 
these services necessitating the local jurisdiction to overinvest. Several exogenous solutions 
to these problems have been offered, including the creation of overlapping districts 
governments, consolidation of existing units and establishment of a metropolitan 
government, or direct state or federal intervention.  
Poliycentricists look to establish overlapping special purpose governments as a 
mechanism to preserve the efficiency of public goods markets while addressing scale and 
externality problems (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Parks and Oakerson, 1989; 
Schneider 1989; Tiebout 1956).1 Consolidationists and proponents of the “new 
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regionalism” advocate a metropolitan-wide general purpose government to address these 
problems (Downs 1994; Katz 2000; Lowery 2000). Scholars working in the tradition of 
fiscal federalism (Oates 1972; Peterson 1981, 1995) suggest externalities should be 
corrected by a central government either through direct provision or central mandate, or 
through price mechanism such as grants or tax to the local governments.    
Each of these approaches suffers from several limitations. While consolidation, 
overlapping districts or higher level government intervention address scale and externality 
problems, they reduce local control, create allocation inefficiencies, and increases 
coordination costs (Brierly 2004). Although horizontal competition among local units can 
enhance efficiency, vertical competition among overlapping units has been shown to 
increase costs of government (Foster 1997). Overlapping governments also create a 
common pool resource problem as overlapping jurisdictions compete for the same tax base 
(Bae 2006; Berry 2002).  
Consolidation of governments has proven exceedingly difficult to achieve and, in 
practice, is subject to coordination and transaction cost problems (Carr 2004). Finally, 
central correction of externalities has significant economic and political costs. The 
estimation of externalities and the determination of appropriate subsidies by a higher level 
government are difficult and complicated (Breton 1965); thus, objective compensation is 
unlikely. Besides, central intervention may also face goal incongruence (Nicholson-Crotty 
2004), principal-agent problems (Chubb, 1985), or a tendency to over centralize, in which 
case efficiency gains from decentralized governance may be lost (Oates, 1999). 
Horizontal federalism through interlocal agreements among local government units 
provides an endogenous alternative solution to scale and externality problems. Despite the 
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prevalence of cooperative arrangements in many metropolitan areas (ACIR 1985)), this 
approach has been given less attention by both scholars and metropolitan reformers (Katz 
2000). Although several case studies recognized the importance of interlocal collaboration 
(see, Kurtz 1948; Satterfield 1947; Seyler, 1974), empirical works examining interlocal 
cooperation are limited, focused at an aggregate level of analysis, or deal exclusively with 
external conditions affecting interlocal collaboration (see, Campbell and Glynn 1990; 
Krueger and McGuire 2005; Krueger 2006; Liebman, et. al. 1963; Marando 1968; Morgan 
and Hirlinger 1991; Post 2002;).  
We focus on service level analysis and examine how local governments can address 
the problems of economies of scale and externalities by themselves through interlocal 
cooperation (or cooperative governance). Interlocal cooperation involves voluntary 
transactions between two or more local governments to accomplish common goals. 
Interlocal cooperation does not require costly centralized solutions or political 
consolidation. Instead, local governments gain economies of scale and devise acceptable 
compensation to internalize positive or negative externalities through mutual bargaining 
and negotiation. 
While this cooperative resolution is potentially superior to regional reform 
alternatives, it is also limited by transaction cost problems. These include problems related 
to the transaction cost properties of public goods and services, and problems of trust and 
commitment related to the service network relationships in which a local government is 
imbedded. 
This article investigates how transaction cost risks and social structure influence 
collaborations across services and the extent of such collaborations. We apply an 
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innovative theoretical approach that combines elements of transaction cost and social 
exchange theories, since successful exchange is conditioned by both the transaction 
characteristics of the service and the social structure faced by the local governments. 
Building from an institutional collective action framework (Feiock 2004, 2005), we 
develop and test hypotheses linking interlocal service cooperation in metropolitan areas to 
the characteristics of services provided and to the trust produced by patterns of previous 
cooperation.   
 
Interlocal Service Agreements – Mechanism of Interlocal Cooperation 
Local political units commonly cooperate through voluntary service agreements 
(Friesema, 1971; ICMA, 1997; Thumaier and Wood 2002; Wood 2006). Fifty-two percent 
of cities surveyed by ACIR (1985) had formal intergovernmental agreements or contacts. 
Warner and Hefetz (2001) found about one-sixth of all services were delivered through 
joint provision of services or local intergovernmental contracting. These agreements 
emerge from a dynamic political contracting process between or among local government 
units and may be informal or formal. Informal agreements are often the results of 
‘handshake’ deals among officials where the division of service responsibility is 
understood but never formalized (Post 2004). Formal cooperation involves written 
agreements where responsibilities of exchange partners are generally defined by 
contractual obligations and formal relationships.   
Formal cooperative arrangements include payment-for-service agreements, joint 
(service) agreements, and service exchange agreements (ACIR 1985; ICMA 1995). In 
payment-for-service agreements, one local government provides a service to another 
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government for an agreed upon price. Joint (service) agreements occur when two or more 
local governments share in planning, financing or delivering a service. Implementation 
modalities may vary. They may divide responsibilities, assign the responsibility to one 
partner or create an entirely a new entity (such as a library cooperative), for the production 
of the agreed service (in this case, library services). Finally, service exchange agreements 
are service quid-pro-quo arrangements in which exchange partners agree to mutually lend 
services to one another at their own cost. Mutual aid agreements for emergency medical 
service or fire are examples of service exchange agreements.  
Local governments pursue various formal and informal cooperative agreements in 
an attempt to address externalities and achieve economies of scale they would otherwise be 
unable to capture on their own (Bish 2000; Feiock 2004). These voluntary service 
agreements provide institutional rules to guide the behavior of cooperative partners as well 
as a means to translate mutual commitments (Carr 2005; Gerber 2005; LeRoux 2006). 
Formal service agreements, particularly payment-for-service and joint agreements involve 
exchange of funds. Such financial transactions are substantial and their levels vary among 
services.2  
Table 1 about Here 
Theoretical Framework 
Our model of interlocal service agreement begins with the Coase Theorem (1960): 
absent transaction costs, rational actors will achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of 
resources through voluntary bargaining even in the presence of positive or negative 
externalities. When the transaction costs of cooperative agreements are low relative to the 
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gains from cooperation, participating local governments can enter into a cooperative 
agreement through mutual bargaining (Bish 1971).  
Local governments, however, face potential transaction barriers. These include 
information, negotiation, enforcement, and agency costs associated with entering or 
maintaining the cooperative agreements (Feiock 2005). Incomplete or asymmetric 
information increases the cost of collaboration. While incomplete information increases 
search cost for a suitable partner, potential strategic use of information advantage over a 
partner puts cooperation at risk. Similarly, differences in bargaining power between actors 
increases negotiation costs. For example, large cities generally possess greater bargaining 
power than smaller cities with little potential to realize scale economies alone. Moreover, 
cities with higher service needs, shorter time preference, or facing fiscal stress and 
unemployment problems will be in weaker bargaining position (Steinacker, 2004). 
Negotiation becomes difficult when exchange partners perceive an unfair distribution from 
the joint gains.  
Conditions of exchange such as need for the service, fiscal capacity, and political 
climate can change. These changes, or simply opportunistic behavior, may prompt partners 
to defect. Safeguarding cooperative agreements from such potential hazards increases 
enforcement costs. Cooperative agreements are also subject to agency problems. Since 
public officials negotiating cooperative agreements are motivated by their own individual 
interests, their preferences may depart from the preferences of the citizens they represent 
(Feiock 2002).  
The ability of local government to minimize these transaction costs is contingent 
upon the external and internal conditions under which exchange takes place. These 
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conditions include the transaction characteristics of service, characteristics of communities, 
and the networks of participating units as well as the structure of social relations within 
which the economic transaction occurs. We focus on both the transaction characteristics of 
services and trust developed overtime to explain the interlocal cooperation. 
 
Transaction characteristics of service and interlocal cooperation 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that actors will choose a governance 
form that minimizes transaction costs associated with an exchange (Williamson 1981). This 
idea assumes the presence of alternative governance forms available to actors participating 
in exchange. Williamson (1991) documented several of these that include market, hierarchy 
(internal supply), and various hybrids such as long-term contracting, reciprocal 
investments, franchising. Interlocal cooperation is one such governance form. Following 
TEC logic, local governments would engage into interlocal cooperation when that 
governance form minimizes the transaction costs of exchange relative to other forms.    
Bounded rationality and self-interest driven opportunism of actors produce risks in 
exchange relationships (Williamson, 1991). The limited ability of actors to foresee 
exchange hazards and the opportunism of partners produces uncertainties. As a 
consequence, they factor these uncertainties into agreements thus raising the transaction 
costs of collaboration. Two transaction cost factors extensively analyzed in a discrete 
choice setting are asset specificity and measurement difficulty in an exchange (Williamson, 
1981). The argument is that these factors shape actors’ transaction cost risks and thus 
determines the governance choice. We extend this theory to argue that these same factors 
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also affect the degree of risks actors would be willing to take ex-post the agreement in 
determining the level of collaboration.  
 
Asset specificity and interlocal service cooperation 
Asset specificity arises when a service transaction requires significant relation-
specific investments that are largely non-deployable to alternative uses (Williamson 1991). 
For example, when city A installs additional machinery to increase the capacity of its 
sewage treatment plant to accommodate the mutually agreed upon needs of city B, then city 
A’s investment becomes transaction-specific, as the added equipment can not be used for 
alternative purposes such as potable water treatment. Although relation-specific 
investments can take various forms3, a common consequence of such specific investments 
is that it increases potential for opportunism the more specialized the investment becomes 
(Williamson 1981). The dependency between transactors also deepens as the relation-
specific investment becomes more customized because the parties are locked into the 
highly tailored investment (Williamson 1991). The continuity of the relationship becomes 
critical for mutual gain.  
However, such relation-specific transactions suffer from opportunism and 
uncertainties. Behavioral opportunism arises when actors threaten to terminate the 
relationship in an attempt to appropriate a larger share of the joint gains. Uncertainties 
occur when the conditions of exchange change over time motivating partners to back out. 
Temptation to hold-up or renege increases the transaction costs of exchange. The 
transaction costs increase further when the exchange partners require coordination to 
safeguard the transaction through mutual adaptation.  
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Market governance based on coordination through price mechanisms is unsuitable 
to minimize uncertainties that arise due to specialized or customized investments in 
transaction. Local governments, instead, may opt for internal supply to minimize potential 
opportunism or coordination costs. Although it reduces these costs, it becomes unattractive 
if it increases delays, raise internal coordination costs, and results in the loss of economies 
of scale in production. Williamson (1991) suggested that intermediate governance or 
hybrid forms could be superior to market or hierarchy (in-house production) for exchange 
situations in which internal coordination costs are high relative to the gains from the 
exchange. Studies of inter-firm collaboration in the private sector support this idea. Firms 
confronted with this situation employ legal contracts to safeguard exchanges in which the 
governance form moves from market-like transactions to relational governance to unified 
governance with increased levels of asset specificity in exchange (Dyer 1997; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995).  
Local governments also face asset specific risks in collaboration. We expect higher 
level of collaboration when asset specificity is low because uncertainty is also low.  But, at 
a very high level of asset specificity, the risks become great. Then the level of collaboration 
declines as local governments move from collaborative governance to internal supply of 
services. Based on this logic we hypothesize:  
H1:  The relationship between asset specificity and interlocal service cooperation 
follows an inverted “U” shape: at lower levels, asset specificity increases 
cooperation, but beyond some point, further increases in asset specificity 
decrease cooperation. 
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Measurement difficulty and interlocal cooperation 
Measurement difficulty occurs when neither service performance nor the activities 
to be performed are easily observed or measured (Brown and Potoski 2003). Even writing 
an agreement is difficult for such services because either their outputs are not tangible or 
production is complex (Ferris and Graddy 1986). Local government services differ in their 
degree of measurement difficulty. Some goods such as sewer, water, and refuse collection 
are easier to measure than others like fire, police or emergency services. Negotiation costs 
rise as fair distribution of benefits and costs become difficult to determine. Thus longer 
times are required to settle agreements. Even after agreement, measurement difficulties 
amplify uncertainties due to potential problems of free-riding and opportunistic behavior.  
The relationship between measurement difficulty and interlocal service cooperation 
is complex. In general, cooperation is easier to achieve for services that are easily measured 
(Steinacker 2004) as opposed to services whose outputs are not tangible. Local 
governments may only enter into payment-for-service agreements when measurement 
difficulty is low. When measurement difficulty is moderate, jurisdictions may still engage 
into collaboration through joint or service exchange arrangements to minimize the potential 
free-riding or opportunism in exchange. But when measurement difficulty becomes 
extreme, the transaction costs of exchange are likely to exceed the gains from 
collaboration, thus motivating the parties to internalize service production rather than 
cooperate.  
The dynamics may be opposite when local governments find alternative service 
providers to cater their needs. When measurement difficulty is low, local government may 
rely on private providers, as the gain from market transaction may be still be greater than 
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the cost of monitoring the private vendor. But, when measurement difficulty becomes very 
high, leading to high cost of monitoring private providers, these local governments may 
turn to their governmental peers because they can reduce uncertainties through joint 
initiatives. They may also consider their peers more reliable in comparison to private 
providers because of similar goal of public service.  
In their study, Brown and Potoski (2003b) found support for the earlier argument. 
They show that local governments deliver easily measured services more often through 
external providers, including other governments; but when services are very difficult to 
measure, they reduce external reliance on production. Following this, we hypothesize that 
H2:  The relationship between measurement difficulty and interlocal service 
cooperation has an inverted “U” shape: at low levels, measurement 
difficulty increases cooperation, but after some point measurement difficulty 
decreases cooperation 
 
Social trust and interlocal cooperation 
Service agreements among local governments occur in the context of multiplex 
relationship. Local officials of different communities are linked through personal 
relationships, professional associations, or working relations. This resembles Granovettor’s 
claim (1985) that economic exchange is embedded in social structure. These relationships 
help them know each other, create social capital and build trust. Gulati (1995) argues that 
familiarity between organizations through their prior alliances breeds trust.  
Trust shaped by previous relationships improves cooperation in two ways. First, it 
mitigates transactional uncertainties, reduces both ex ante and ex post opportunism, and 
creates opportunities for exchange of services (Granovettor 2005; Poppo and Zenger 2002; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). For example, in the case of New York apparel business, 
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Uzzi (1996) found that the manufacturer shared its business relocation decision to Asia 
only with its close-knit suppliers (but not with other contractors) nine months ahead of the 
relocation in order to give them opportunities to adapt their business. The suppliers also 
reciprocated the manufacture’s ‘trustworthiness’ by maintaining quality supply although 
they could have exploited the situation to their advantage by supplying low quality goods. 
Norms associated with trust such as fair distribution of costs and benefits also generate 
flexibility among exchange partners to cope with uncertainties and to deal with worries 
related to measurement difficulty that arise in exchange. 
Second, trust creates a foundation for continued and expanded future relationships. 
The potential of repeated interaction is high in the case of local governments because, 
unlike individuals and firms, they are geographically fixed (Feiock 2005). Expectations of 
future pay-offs from cooperative behavior encourage cooperation in the present. Such 
expectation is dependent on the actor’s experience of past dealings. Sociologists maintain 
that trust furnishes the basis for offering and discharging subsequent commitments which 
then becomes concrete as actors reciprocate exchanges (Uzzi 1996). Repeated exchange 
provides information about the partners which allows them to make informed choices of 
who to trust and how much to trust. Granovetter (1985) argues that information gained 
from personal past dealing with an exchange partner is more trustworthy; hence, the 
partner’s behavior becomes more predictable leading to sound basis for future cooperation. 
In the case of watershed partnerships, Schneider et. al. (2003) found that the emergence of 
trust and norms of reciprocity based on repeated interactions foster collective action. 
Likewise, Olberding (2002) showed that norms of cooperation promoted regional 
collaboration in economic development.  
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Local governments, however, may encounter temptation to break trust. Granovettor 
(1985) observes that the more complete the trust, the greater the potential gain from 
malfeasance. However, social structures help restrain such temptations. A generalized 
reputation of ‘trustworthiness’ developed through mutual dealings (Poppo and Zenger 
2002) prevents local governments from breaking a trust. The political, economic and social 
costs of reputational damage from non-trustworthy behavior could be very high. Networks 
of exchange relationship among local governments also constrain opportunistic behavior 
through the quick spread of (bad) news within the network or through other forms of group 
sanctions. Consistent with Ostrom’s (1990) views, service agreements also shape the 
behavior of local governments in exchange. These agreements work as a basis for 
formalizing shared expectations and assumptions of what constitutes accepted behavior 
and, as a result, open up further avenues of cooperation that otherwise would not be 
feasible (Arrighetti, et. al. 1997). Hence, our hypothesis is: 
H3:  The relationship between trust resulting from previous exchange and 
interlocal cooperation is linear: the greater the level of previous exchange, 
the higher the interlocal service cooperation. 
 
Data, Measures and Method 
In order to test the above hypotheses, we use regression analysis to estimate the 
impact of transaction characteristics of service and social trust on the likelihood and the 
level of interlocal cooperation for all Georgia cities with populations above 2,500 listed in 
The Municipal Year Book 2002. Our analysis is cross-sectional and uses the latest Census 
of Government Finance data for the year 2002. The unit of analysis is city and service type 
for eleven different city level services chosen because measures of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty are available for each of them4. Data were obtained from the 
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Census of Government Finance, The Municipal Year Book 2002, and the Census of 
Population 2000. 
 We first discuss the measures that affect the level of cooperation followed by the 
factors that determine the likelihood of cooperation. The details of the variable construction 
are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 about Here 
 
Measures for the Level of Interlocal Cooperation 
For the analysis of the level of interlocal cooperation, the dependent variable is the 
amount of expenditure (or payments) a city has made to other local governments for the 
supply of each of the eleven public services. Our measure of interlocal service 
collaboration is fiscal and is consistent with the previous studies (see Bickers and Stein 
2004; Campbell and Glynn 1990; Post 2002; Rawlings 2003). It includes a city’s 
expenditure for payment-for-service and/or joint service agreements to other local 
governments. Furthermore, this is the only fiscal measure available by service types 
suitable to our unit of analysis5. However, this measure is conservative as it excludes 
informal and non-fiscal portions of formal cooperation6. We transformed the variable into a 
per capita measure to account for heteroscedasticity.  
Asset specificity and measurement difficulty of a service in exchange are the key 
independent variables. We employed the asset specificity and measurement difficulty 
scales developed by Brown and Potoski (2003). These measures are based on the 
perception ratings of randomly selected city managers and mayors across the country. 
These values are the average of the ratings given to each measure on a scale of 1 to 5 for 
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each service. Higher values for a particular service in the respective scales indicate higher 
asset-specificity and greater measurement difficulty. We use linear terms - asset specificity, 
measurement difficulty - and their corresponding quadratic terms - asset specificity 
squared, measurement difficulty square - in order to capture the hypothesized inverted U-
shaped relationship between each of these measures and interlocal collaboration (H1, H2).  
Another independent variable of interest is the level of trust between cooperating 
cities as indicated in their previous cooperative interactions. We operationalized these 
relationships based on a city’s level of inerlocal service expenditure in the past. Since a 
city’s interlocal expenditures are investments in payment-for-service or joint service 
agreements with other local governments, a higher degree of investment in these activities 
would generally mean greater level of trust between exchange partners. We used 1997 per 
capita inerlocal service expenditure to capture this measure. This is the latest census 
available which is conducted in every five year intervals.  
 Two fiscal variables included in the analysis are city’s per capita property tax 
revenue and per capita intergovernmental grants (federal and state). Cities fiscal health is 
largely dependent on their fiscal capacity and on federal and state grants. Any decline in 
these revenue sources would put them under severe fiscal pressure. When cities are fiscally 
stressed, they tend to seek alternative delivery mechanisms to cut down delivery costs 
(Ferris and Graddy 1986; Nelson 1997). Cooperation with other local governments in 
service provision is one obvious option since it gives cities leverage to cope with fiscal 
hardships (Stein 1990). We expect that cities facing greater fiscal stress will cooperate 
more than those that are in less fiscal pressure. 
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Measures for the Likelihood of Interlocal Cooperation 
 In addition to characteristics of services, social trust, and fiscal measures, we 
include several other variables that affect the likelihood of collaboration. These include 
externalities, economies of scale, demographic heterogeneity, form of government, demand 
for services, and the availability of potential providers.  
Externalities and economies of scale motivate cooperation. We follow Post (2002) 
and Bickers and Stein (2004) and use geographical density of local governments to capture 
the externalities effects. Since the geographic density measures the spatial distribution of 
local governments, it has potential to capture the inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Higher 
density of local governments implies greater spillover effects. We operationalize the 
variable by dividing the number of general purpose local governments in a county by the 
land area of the county. A U-shape relationship is expected between spillover effect and the 
likelihood of cooperation. When spillover problems are low, cities may be less willing to 
cooperate because the gain from service cooperation may not be high enough to outweigh 
the transaction cost risks involved. But after some point, when the spillovers effects get 
higher, they may be willing to enter into service collaboration because the gains from 
collaboration could be higher than the transactions cost risks. Spillover and spillover 
squared variables are used to capture the hypothesized nonlinear relationship. 
Generally, larger size increases the likelihood of gain from economies of scale. 
Hence, smaller cities may find scale economies easier to achieve by turning to an area-wide 
government provider (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991) or by joining other local governments. 
Large cities, on the other hand, may feel less pressure to join with other local governments 
to gain from economies of scale because of their greater size, even though they may also 
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gain by cooperating with others. Scale is typically measured by population size (Nelson 
1997; Jossart-Marcelli and Musso 2005). Hence, we use population in thousand to measure 
the economies of scale.  
 Demographic heterogeneity increases transaction costs, reducing the likelihood of 
collaboration. It reflects economic and political power asymmetries that create problems 
for fair division of benefits between different groups. Aggregating community preference is 
more difficult in a heterogeneous community than in a homogeneous community; thus, 
demographic heterogeneity also increases agency costs for local officials negotiating 
agreements on behalf of cities. We calculated a weighted racial heterogeneity index from 
the racial composition data which is the sum of the squared proportion of the population of 
each race in a city7. 
 A council-manger government dummy variable, coded 1 if the city has a council-
manger government, and 0 otherwise, measures the form of government. Council-manger 
government is often considered innovative and efficiency oriented in comparison to mayor-
council government (Ruhil, et. al. 1999). Furthermore, professional managers share 
information and diffuse best practices in an isomorphic fashion through the profession 
(Brown and Potoski 2003). This reduces information search costs for transactions. Thus, 
service cooperation is expected to be more likely in cites with council-manger government 
than in cities with mayor-council government.  
Median household income is included to measure the residents’ effective demand 
for services. Since the nature of the need and ability to pay for the service differ between 
poor and rich communities, both communities may opt for interlocal service agreements 
(Morgan and Hirlinger 1991). Communities with low income may be motivated for 
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collaboration in order to maintain or increase their services by cutting down the costs. Rich 
communities, on the other hand, may enter into cooperation for additional quantity or 
higher quality services because of their increased ability to pay for those services. A U-
shape relationship is expected between community income and the likelihood of interlocal 
cooperation.  
 Finally, the availability of potential service providers and their proximity also affect 
the likelihood of interlocal cooperation. Availability of potential providers may generate 
market-like conditions for a city (Stein 1990) or it may increase cities’ potential for 
entering into service agreements since they may find other local government providers to 
work with (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991). Because of this ambiguity, Krueger and McGuire 
(2005) suggested to measure heterogeneity (or homogeneity) between local governments, 
not simply their counts, to capture the notion of interlocal competition. They argued that 
homogeneous local governments compete while heterogeneous local governments 
cooperate although this relationship is not substantiated in an MSA level study (Krueger 
2006). Since geographic proximity matters in the case of local service provision, we 
included two binary location variables - metropolitan status of a city and whether a city is 
located in a populous county - to capture both the potential availability of external 
providers and the notion of geographic proximity. For a city, location in a populous county 
better represents closeness than location in an MSA. We expect a higher likelihood of 
either effect (competition or cooperation) in the case of former. These binary measures are 
coded 1 if the city is located in the MSA/micropolitan area or above average populous 
county, 0 otherwise.  
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 The summary statistics reported in Table 2 show that there are 1,793 observations 
in the sample, of which 116 report interlocal service expenditures. The means and standard 
deviations indicate variation across observations. With respect to binary variables, about 54 
percent of the cities have council-manger form, 22 percent are located in metropolitan 
areas, 36 percent are located in a more populous county and about 8 percent have previous 
fiscal exchanges. Although the sample (N=163) consists of more than 90 percent of total 
municipal population, it includes only 32 percent of Georgia cities because the sample does 
not include cities with populations below 2,500.  
  
Estimation strategy 
 Not all cities engaged in interlocal service collaboration, and cities that did not 
collaborate report zero interlocal service expenditures.  As a result, degree of collaboration 
is observed only for the cities that collaborate. Analysis of only cities that entered into 
service collaboration, or of all cities (including those that did not collaborate) separately 
would lead to biased estimates. Since we are interested in investigating both the likelihood 
interlocal service collaboration as well as the level of collaboration conditional on the 
choice of collaboration, we employ a Heckman two-step sample selection model 
(Wooldridge 2003). The Heckman two-step procedure consists of two equations in a single 
model and jointly estimates the likelihood of a city entering into collaboration taking into 
account all the cities in the sample, and the level of service collaboration, given the city’s 
likelihood collaboration in the first place.8 The procedure uses probit estimation in the first 
stage using all observations and computes the inverse mills ratio. In the second stage, it 
estimates an OLS model of outcome equation including the inverse mills ratio in the model 
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using the subset of the sample. When two equations are correlated, use of probit or OLS 
alone would produce biased estimates.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 The results of the estimation are presented in Table 39. The model is statistically 
significant. The selection parameter, ρ, is also significant. This confirms that the error 
terms of both equations are correlated justifying the use of sample selection model for 
empirical estimation.  
Table 3 about Here 
The overlap of some independent variables in both equations and the presence of 
quadratic terms for some variables increase the complexity of interpreting the estimates. 
Predicted marginal effects of the individual variables, holding all other variables constant at 
their mean, were calculated for substantive interpretation of the coefficients. The predicted 
marginal effects of significant variables are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4 about Here 
Transaction characteristics of services (H1, H2) 
The results indicate that the asset specificity and measurement difficulty both have 
significant impacts on the likelihood of cooperation. They are statistically significant with 
the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationships. The calculated marginal effects of these 
variables on the changes in the probability of interlocal service collaboration reveal that the 
asset specificity has the largest effect. When asset specificity is low to moderate, a change 
of one unit in its scale above and below the mean (3.16) would increase the probability of 
service cooperation by about sixty-five percent; but when the asset specificity is very high, 
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above the mean, the same one unit change in its scale above and below the mean would 
decrease the likelihood of cooperation by about ten percent. In the case of measurement 
difficulty, the corresponding increase and decrease in the probability of service cooperation 
with one unit change in its scale above or below mean scale (2.65) and beyond its mean 
would be about twelve percent and about two and half percent, respectively.  
Figure 1 shows the inverted U-shaped relationship. The vertical axis depicts the 
probability of entering into interlocal collaboration holding all other independent variables 
at their means. The horizontal axis represents the degree of asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty measured in scales from low to high. The figure indicates that as 
the asset specificity and measurement difficulty increase from their low values to moderate 
level (for example, to their means), the likelihood of engaging into interlocal collaboration 
increases. In the case of asset specificity, when its value goes up from minimum to mean, 
the probability of interlocal cooperation increases by about 0.08. For measurement 
difficulty, the increase in probability of interlocal cooperation is about 0.02 when the scale 
of difficulty increases from its minimum to the mean. Once the levels of asset specificity 
and measurement difficulty get beyond their respective means to their maximum values, 
the corresponding likelihoods of entering into interlocal collaboration decrease by about 
0.07 and 0.03 respectively. 
Figure 1 about Here 
 However, neither of our transaction costs variables have the expected impact on the 
level of service collaboration. The coefficients for the asset specificity and measurement 
difficulty are not statistically significant. Asset specificity has the expected direction of 
relationship with the level of service cooperation indicating that the amount of service 
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collaboration increases with the increase in the asset specificity. The coefficient for the 
measurement difficulty shows negative sign which is opposite to hypothesized direction of 
relationship. Although the reported relationship is linear, the most likely estimated 
relationship is U-shaped. This is contrary to our expectation of an inverted U-shape 
relationship10. This indicates that the transaction costs dynamics that involves both the 
choice and the amount of collaboration are different from the transaction uncertainties that 
entail only whether to collaborate or not.  
 Although it is not possible to test this directly from our data, we believe that the 
possible explanation for the likely U-shape relationship at the level of collaboration lies in 
the trade-off between the gains from the collaboration and the capacity to mange the 
uncertainties. With an increase in measurement difficulty, up to a point, the cities perhaps 
can manage (or bear) the transaction costs risks against the gains from collaboration. Cities 
generally have some internal managerial capacity for monitoring the activities which help 
them to manage the risks associated with the measurement difficulty. This would imply 
that the cities would continue to engage into payment-for-service type service collaboration 
with decreasing level of financial involvement as the uncertainties from measurement 
difficulty gets higher. But, after some point, when the transaction costs risks become too 
for an exchange of high financial involvement, cities perhaps switch to joint investment 
activities or multilateral compacts to minimize the transaction cost risks. This tendency 
would then lead to increase in the amount of service collaboration beyond some point as 
the risk of financial involvement gets higher associated with the measurement difficulty in 
transaction. Further investigation is required in this regard.  
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Previous Exchange (H3) 
 The result supports the hypotheses that social trust built through past exchange 
affects both the level and the likelihood of service cooperation. The marginal contribution 
of previous exchange for all cities is about 0.045; that is, an increase of one hundred dollars 
in the past interlocal service expenditures to other local governments above or below its 
mean would increase the interlocal service collaboration by about four and half dollars. For 
cities already in the collaboration, the expected marginal collaboration with the same 
amount of past exchange in service collaboration would be about fifty six dollars.  
Regarding the likelihood of collaboration, an increase in the mean previous 
exchange would increase the marginal probability of service cooperation about two 
percent. This finding is consistent with Thurmaier and Wood (2002) who contend that local 
governments prefer to engage into service agreements with other local governments 
relative to the private sector because of lower monitoring costs due to greater degree of 
mutual trust compared to the private vendors.  
 
Other variables  
 Consistent with our general expectation, cities facing decline in their own fiscal 
capacity (measured by property tax revenue) increased their level of interlocal service 
cooperation. However, the effect is small. The marginal effect of a decrease of thousand 
dollars in per capita property tax revenue, holding all other variables constant at their 
means, would increase the marginal interlocal service cooperation by about one and half 
dollars for all cities and by about thirty dollars for cities that already engage in cooperation. 
The externalities, measured by the density of local governments, also significantly affected 
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the likelihood of service collaboration. The predicted U-shape relationship is statistically 
significant confirming that cities do not cooperate when spillover effect is low or moderate. 
But they enter into collaboration when the spillover effect is very high and these gains 
outweigh the transaction costs. When the density of local government is low to moderate, 
one unit change in the density above or below its mean (1.67) would decrease the 
probability of service collaboration by about two and half percent. But when the density of 
local government is very high, the same one unit change in the above or below the mean of 
the squared density of local governments would increase the likelihood of service 
cooperation by about four percent. We also find support for our expectation that cities 
located in more populous counties are more willing to collaborate on services than those 
located in less populous counties indicating a market-like affect from multiple providers in 
their vicinity.  However, the marginal impact is very small, about one and one-half percent 
decrease in the probability of service collaboration. Intergovernmental grants did not 
significantly influence either the likelihood or the level of interlocal service collaboration. 
Likewise, other variables in the analysis such as economies of scale, cities located in MSA, 
council-manger government, median income, and demographic heterogeneity did not 
significantly affect the likelihood of interlocal cooperation.  
Conclusion 
 We argued that transaction cost risks across service types and generalized social 
trust grounded in repeated action are critical in determining the likelihood as well as the 
extent of interlocal service collaboration in the supply of local public goods. While the 
findings consistently support our contention with respect to the likelihood of interlocal 
collaboration, we did not find evidence of the impact of the asset specificity and 
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measurement difficulty on the level of interlocal service collaboration. The results clearly 
reveal that the transaction characteristics of goods are significant in influencing the 
collaboration choice of cities – the first stage of the collaborative decision process. This is 
consistent with the basic transaction cost theory which predicts the behavior of actors in 
choosing discrete governance mechanisms in a transaction cost minimizing way 
(Williamson 1991). But once they are engaged in collaboration, the level of collaboration 
depends on the degree of their past dealings – which shape social trust - and the amount of 
fiscal pressure they face. 
 This analysis contributes to the existing literature on institutional collective action 
in several ways. First, the findings provide additional evidence that the local governments 
can and do solve problems of mutual interests collectively. Second, we bring social 
exchange theory into the transaction cost analysis of institutional collective action to better 
understand the intricate connection between social structure and embedded economic 
exchange that affect collective action. This is consistent with observations made from 
several scholars calling for a need to bring theories from other disciplines to complement 
public organization theory to better explain the complex real world reality (Brown and 
Potoski 2003b; Feiock 2005; Thurmaier and Wood 2002). Third, while previous studies 
have employed aggregate-level analysis, we investigate interlocal collaboration across 
various service types to uncover the more complex transaction cost motivations and risks 
associated with service exchange. Fourth, we explicitly modeled the two-stage decision 
process involved in interlocal collaboration which, to our best knowledge, has not been 
done before and which better approximates the reality than extant research. Finally, the 
further evidence of local institutional collection action produced here helps advance the 
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discourse on local governance and policy choices. If local governments can collectively 
solve problems of mutual interests arising out of economies of scale and externalities 
without third party involvement, then the existing role of higher level governments needs to 
be reconsidered. Instead of creating distortions in local collective action and governance 
processes, either through the regulation or price mechanism, higher level governments 
might, instead turn toward facilitating local collaborative processes for solutions to local 
problems.  
 This study is limited to Georgia cities; hence, generalization cannot be made across 
all cities or to other units of the local governments in general. However, our focus on 
service level may give some leverage to extend the finding across service types. Future 
research should examine whether our results apply more generally by including larger 
sample of local governments and/or larger portfolio of services. Another limitation is that 
this study highlights the snapshots of collaborative behavior of cities. We do not know how 
transaction cost risks and other factors influence interlocal collaboration over time. Use of 
panel analysis should provide further insights on the dynamics underlying such behavior. 
Furthermore, our fiscal measure of trustworthiness is imperfect. We tried to capture the 
notion of experience-based trust based on the idea of repeated action and norms of 
reciprocity. Future studies should develop alternate measure of trust such as a perception-
based scale to better match the theoretical construct.  
 Finally, interlcoal service collaboration research should advance in two further 
dimensions. One, the transaction cost theory assumes symmetric distribution of transaction 
risks between or among exchange partners. But this may not be the case. Actors, cities in 
our case, vary in their capacity to assess and manage transaction risks. Hence, they are 
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likely to face different level of risks in exchange which may affect their propensity of 
collaboration differently. Examining of risk asymmetry among actors will greatly improve 
our understanding of the transaction cost uncertainties affecting the interlocal collaborative 
behavior and its outcome. Two, study of interlocal service collaboration is incomplete if the 
pattern of such collaboration is not investigated. Local governments create networks in 
service collaboration. Different network structures are thought to be the responses to 
different transaction cost problems that arise in exchange. We still know very little about 
how these network structures emerge and how they help minimize the exchange hazards.  
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Footnotes
                                                 
 
1 Provision and production units need not be the same in their model. Provision unit is a political authority 
that aggregates community preference, allocates resources, decides on means or makes rules governing the 
behavior to meet the demands (for example, zoning laws). Production unit, on the other hand, could be a 
department of a provision unit itself or a private sector, including non-for-profits that actually produces and 
delivers the service decided by the provision unit (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). 
2 The study sample, Georgia cities, shows that cities spent on average $50 per capita for interlocal 
collaborative activities compared to total expenditures of about $1,953 per capita for all activities in 2002. A 
cross service comparison reveals that the mean per capita total expenditure was the highest for the police 
service ($216.36) and was the lowest for the parking services ($0.68). The highest mean per capita interlocal 
expenditure was about $4.5 for solid waste management service whereas the services like financial 
administration and parking did not have interlocal expenditure in the year 2002 (Table 1).  
3 These are site specificity (fire stations close to the communities), physical asset specificity (water treatment 
plant for the production of potable water), human-asset specificity (forensic expertise), temporal specificity 
(distribution of emergency medical vehicles for timely emergency response), and process-specificity 
(customized computerized billing). For details, see Williamson (1991) and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995). 
4 The Census of Government Finace reports 21services. The study includes 11 services. They are financial 
administration, fire protection, public health, roads/streets, library, parking, parks and recreation, police 
protection, protective inspection, sewerage, and solid waste management for which the asset specificity and 
measurement difficulty scales are available. These scales are not available for housing and community 
development, natural resource management, welfare, and water transport. Air transportation, correction, 
education, hospital, and transit services are excluded because they are generally managed at regional levels.  
5 Revenue measure – local intergovernmental revenue – is available, but it lacks disaggregation by service 
type. See Krueger and McGuire 2005 and Krueger 2006 for the use of the revenue measure. 
6 In the case of Minnesota, the size of informal cooperation was reported to be as high as 28 percent (Beth 
Water Honadle and Patricia Weir Love, Choice for Change: A Guide to Local Government Cooperation and 
Restructuring in Minnesota (http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/citizenship/DH6541.html) 
7 The formula used in calculating the weighted racial heterogeneity index is: 1 - ∑ (ni/N)², where N is total 
population in a city and ni is the number of people belonging to the i-th race (Annett, Anthony, 2001, “Social 
Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Government”. IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 48:3). 
8 More formally, the two equations can be written as  
y* = βх¡ + ε¡     (1) 
and   y = γω¡ + υ¡    (2) 
where y* (equation 1) is the outcome dependent variable measuring the level of interlocal collaboration, and 
y (equation 2) is the selection dependent variable measuring the likelihood of service collaboration (scored 1 
if the city enters into collaboration, otherwise 0). y* is observed when y > 0. х¡ and ω¡ are outcome equation 
and selection equation independent variables, respectively. β and γ are coefficients corresponding to outcome 
equation and selection equation variables. The two parts of the model are tied together through the joint error 
process, which is represented as bivariate normal distribution in which the correlation is determined by the 
parameter ρ. The explanatory variables х¡ are subset of ω¡ to satisfy the exclusion restriction condition 
(Wooldridge 2003). 
9 We used Stata 9 to estimate the models. The model without ‘city located in populous county area’ was also 
estimated because there was a correlation of .64 between ‘populous county area’ and ‘density of local 
government’ variables. However, we did not find major difference on the results. Since these two variables 
measure different theoretical concepts, we included both variables in the final model.  
10 The quadratic terms of these variables were dropped from the final analysis because they were not 
statistically significant. For the measurement difficulty, the first term was significant at about p =.05 and the 
second term was significant at p < .1 levels. When the joint effect of the variable was calculated including the 
quadratic term, the coefficient was not significant at p <.05 level (at 95 % confidence interval: -23. 18 to 
0.89); hence, we dropped the quadratic term from the outcome equation in the final model.  
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Table 1: Per Capita Mean Total and Interlocal Expenditure by Service in Sample Cities, 2002 (in dollars; 
N=163) 
 
Per capital total expenditure Interlocal expenditure Service 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Financial service 23.06 29.79 0.00 0.00 
Fire protection 80.18 62.80 1.08 9.05 
Health 3.46 16.48 0.05 0.47 
Roads 119.44 164.68 0.35 2.14 
Library 8.22 17.67 2.33 8.29 
Parking 0.68 6.22 0.00 0.00 
Parks & recreation 68.71 187.90 2.13 7.40 
Police protection 216.36 145.39 1.91 14.96 
Protective inspections 11.09 15.89 0.00 0.00 
Sewerage 133.70 152.25 0.00 0.00 
Solid waste management 93.45 61.44 4.47 12.44 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Construction 
 
Variable Variable Construction Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Interlocal cooperation A city’s per capita expenditure (payments) to local governments by 
service in 2002 in dollars (Census of Government Finance, 2002) 
1.11 7.42 0.0 170.64 
Independent Variables      
Asset specificity 5-point scale average (Brown & Potoski, 2003) 3.16 0.53 2.36 4.09 
Asset specificity² 5-point scale average squared 10.26 3.38 5.56 16.72 
Measurement difficulty 5-point scale average (Brown & Potoski, 2003) 2.65 0.63 1.53 3.74 
Measurement difficulty² 5-point scale average squared 7.42 3.46 2.34 13.98 
Level of Trust (past 
relation) 
A city’s 1997 per capita expenditure to local governments by service 
in dollars (Census of Government Finance, 1997) 
1.04 6.09 0.00 118.92 
Own source revenue A city’s 1997 per capita property tax revenue in dollars (Census of 
Government Finance, 1997) 
140.69 227.17 0.00 2619.90 
Intergovernmental grants A city’s 1997 per capita grants from federal and state governments 
(Census of Government Finance, 1997) 
41.45 82.10 0.00 800.88 
Policy spillover 
(density/100 sqm) 
Geographic density of general purpose local governments 
controlling for the County area in 100 square mile (Census of 
Government, 2002) 
1.67 0.92 0.22 4.72 
Policy spillover² Policy spillover squared 3.65 4.38 0.04 22.37 
Economies of scale A city’s population in thousand (US Bureau of Census, 2000) 16.18 38.75 0.22 416.47 
Demographic 
heterogeneity 
Weighted racial heterogeneity index: sum of the squared proportion 
of the population of each race in a city (US Bureau of Census, 2000) 
0.45 0.12 0.07 0.70 
Council manager Scored 1 if city has council-manger form of government, 0 otherwise 
(The Municipal Year Book, 2002) 
0.53 0.49 0 1 
Income Median household income in 1000 dollars (US Bureau of Census, 
2000 and city-data.com website) 
33.30 12.53 16.4 84.03 
Income² Income squared 1265.91 1103.57 268.96 7062.38 
City located in 
metropolitan area 
Scored 1 if the city is located in metro or micropolitan areas, 0 
otherwise (Office of Management & Budget) 
0.22 0.41 0 1 
City located in populous 
county area 
Scored 1 if the city is located in a county with population above the 
mean population across counties, otherwise 0. 
0.26 0.44 0.00 1 
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Table 3: Heckman two-stage results for the level of interlocal cooperation between Georgia cities, 2002 
 
Independent Variables Coef. Std. Error 
Level of Cooperation (outcome equation)   
Asset specificity 11.58 8.10 
Measurement difficulty -5.19 5.40 
Level of trust 1.14*** 0.22 
Own source revenue -0.04*** 0.02 
Intergovernmental grants 0.0004 0.018 
Constant -31.34 26.62 
Likelihood of Cooperation (Selection equation)   
Asset specificity 16.62*** 2.71 
Asset specificity² -2.46*** 0.40 
Measurement difficulty 3.12** 1.38 
Measurement difficulty² -0.62*** 0.23 
Level of Trust 0.05*** 0.006 
Own source revenue -0.0013** 0.0006 
Intergovernmental grants 0.0007 0.0006 
Spillover -0.61*** 0.23 
Spillover² 0.11** 0.04 
Economies of scale 0.0006 0.002 
Demographic heterogeneity 0.26 0.58 
Council-manger 0.12 0.11 
Income -0.0008 0.0073 
City located in metropolitan area -0.06 0.15 
City located in populous county area -0.49* 0.25 
Constant -32.32*** 5.35 
Lamda 12.55** 6.03 
Rho 0.55  
Wald chi2 145.7***  
Number of observations (uncensored)    1793 (116)   
*** p <.01; ** p <.05 
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Table 4: Predicted marginal effects of independent variables on the extent and probability of interlocal 
coopeation of Georgia cities, 2002 
 
∆ Level of Interlocal Cooperation Variable 
Conditional Unconditional 
∆ Probability of 
Cooperation 
Outcome equation    
Level of trust 0.56 0.04  
Own source revenue -0.03 -0.001  
Selection equation    
Spillover   -2.4 % 
Spillover²   0.4 % 
Level of trust   0.2 % 
Own source revenue   -0.005 %@ 
Asset specificity   65.2 % 
Asset specificity²   -9.6 % 
Measurement difficulty   12.2 % 
Measurement difficulty²   -2.4 % 
Populous county area   -1.5 % 
@ Significant at p < .1 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Cooperation by Asset Specificity (AS) and Measurement Difficulty 
(MD) 
 
